History of the German night fighter force, 1917-1945

Hardbound 15x23 cm, 284 pages. Nazi Germany was not defenseless below RAF night bombers during WW II. They modified dayfighters and assigned crews to specialist units; pilots' primary qualifications being an ability to fly on instruments, and radiomen, to tune and receive ground signals. (Later, they were sent for advanced training on the new aircraft radars.) -see appendix 10 for receiver specs and their limited receptivity. As the book points out, General Kammhuber established belts of searchlights, and those fighters would take position as the bombers flew through the light, following one and shooting at it. However, each of the 16 squadrons reported an average of 3.7 crews available in January 1941. Considering the hundreds of attackers, Flak artillery was the greater danger. With advent of the first (ground-based) radars, this improved enough that more interceptions occurred in the dark areas. In the technological see-saw, RAF developed a stealth-y defense. They sent tinfoil strips to be dropped periodically by bombers. It was operation Gomorrah in July 1943 that panicked the Nazis. The RAF, given the mandate to pay back for the fire-bombing of English cities, attacked Hamburg during a dry spell. In three terrible nights, the city burned and 43,000 died. Radars were blinded by the fluttering foil strips. The book details the steady escalation of the airwar after that. Even Hitler's revenge- the V1 and V2 unguided missiles, failed to alter the destruction suffered by Germany. The book traces first signs on p. 128: ' But enemy bombing was only one side of the story. For the real cause of this performance shortfall we have to look at the aero-engine manufacturers, which, largely because of raw material shortages, did not succeed in producing more powerful engines with longer service lives. By mid 1943 the basic BMW 801, DB 605 and DB 603, and the Jumo 213 engines had reached their development limits. 9780354012478